Control of public media, sector concentration, economic pressures on independent newsrooms: Hungary's media landscape has undergone profound changes under Viktor Orbán's rule. Between the KESMA foundation, a power-friendly conglomerate that brings together several hundred media outlets, and regime-allied oligarchs seizing numerous titles such as the newspaper Blikk and the website Index, the landscape has progressively locked down. Days before elections in Hungary, the media takeover carried out by the leader becomes all the more visible and even tends to accelerate.
But beyond the Hungarian case, it is the spread of this method within Europe that is concerning, driven notably by the electoral successes of the far right. From Slovakia to Italy, passing through France, several weak signals suggest similar dynamics: weakening of public media, concentration, clientelism, attacks on journalists.
Interview with Pavol Szalai, head of the European Union and Balkans office at Reporters Without Borders.
Owen Huchon: Fifteen years after Viktor Orbán first came to power and with elections approaching, can we say that the leader's project to seize control of the press has succeeded?
Pavol Szalai: Viktor Orbán has largely succeeded with his project. It's no coincidence that RSF branded him a press freedom predator several years ago, and that he continues to appear on that list in our report published last year. It's an entire system of economic, political and legal techniques and methods through which he has muzzled independent media. He has established his party's domination over the media landscape broadly, extending into the digital space.
It is important to recall that Viktor Orbán is a press predator, that Hungary ranks among the last countries in the European Union in RSF's World Press Freedom Index, and that Fidesz, his party, controls over 80% of the Hungarian media landscape, without journalists being killed, physically assaulted, arbitrarily arrested or imprisoned. It is a media dictatorship that Viktor Orbán has established, without destroying certain freedoms, particularly those of journalists.
You're talking about 80% control. Specifically, what does that mean?
This is a figure that comes from an analysis carried out a few years ago by a Hungarian think tank, Mérték, which studied media ownership and their editorial lines. We know the situation has deteriorated further since then.
There is first the KESMA (a foundation serving the government that brings together around 500 media outlets, editor's note). For others, it is not Orbán personally, or Fidesz, who own them, but oligarchs close to the party. Media outlets that were once public are now party media, entirely controlled by the government, which broadcasts not only government propaganda, but also Russian propaganda. This government, in terms of both communication and policy, is pro-Russian. For example, at the start of the war, they refused to call the Russian invasion of Ukraine a war and spoke of an "special operation".
Orbán and his close associates also control Hungary's media regulatory authority. Recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union condemned Hungary for refusing to renew a broadcasting licence for Klubrádió, an independent radio station that has only broadcast online for several years. It was this regulatory authority that, for arbitrary and entirely disproportionate reasons despite administrative faults committed by the station, sanctioned it by refusing to renew its licence. A call for tenders was launched for this same licence, which this station was not allowed to bid for. These two decisions were ultimately ruled to be contrary to European Union law.
Also part of the Orbán system is an authority for protecting sovereignty, which systematically defames journalists critical of the government. Smear campaigns already existed and were frequent and violent, but with the creation of this authority, they are now institutionalized. It is state policy to defame Hungarian journalists who represent the country's independent journalism.
I would even say that Orbán deliberately allows certain independent media to survive, which enables him to claim that there are still critical media outlets in Hungary. This was precisely his reaction to RSF's decision to list him as the first European Union leader on its press freedom predators list. He made a video in which he went to a newspaper kiosk to show them. Yes, they exist, but their influence is incomparable to the Fidesz media machine.
Gradually weakening the media, especially financially, rather than repressing them head-on and violently: is this Orbán's method and the key to his success?
Exactly. We haven't yet talked about state advertising. In the Hungarian market, the subscription model doesn't really work, so media depend on advertising, often state advertising. Also, for countries in this region, European funds represent an important source of advertising revenue for media, because states and institutions are obliged to communicate about how they use these funds or to launch tenders. This is a revenue source. But it's the national government that decides where this advertising is placed.
That's the first method to weaken the media: remove advertising. Then you find an oligarch to buy them. That was the case with Index, which is now a pro-government media outlet. A large number of journalists left and created an independent media outlet called Telex, cofinanced through a digital subscription system.
As far as advertising is concerned, these methods are now contrary to European law, thanks to the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which requires Member States to distribute advertising based on objective and transparent criteria.
There is also the example of a recent Hungarian bill that aimed to penalize media and NGOs receiving foreign funding.
Exactly, we can speak here too of an attempt to suffocate the media. They would have been sanctioned for receiving foreign funding, even European funding, which, in the Hungarian market, represents a necessary source of financing, in an environment where there are hardly any digital subscriptions, where advertising is limited, and where there is a strong presence of European donors.
This law, which expanded the authority's powers to protect sovereignty, was withdrawn under international pressure.
You said at the beginning that Viktor Orbán had succeeded in his project to control the press. How do you explain that a country could reach that point within the European Union? Is it a lack of political will, legal limitations, or both?
It's both. There is a procedure, provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which makes it possible to sanction a Member State in the event of a violation of the values of the European Union, as defined in Article 2. This concerns freedom of expression, even though press freedom is not explicitly mentioned there.
We are calling for Hungary to be sanctioned, notably through the withdrawal of its voting rights in the Council of the European Union. Previously, there was PiS Poland, Orbán's ally, which made this scenario impossible. Today, the priority is also to help Ukraine and, for certain decisions, Hungary's agreement remains necessary. We fully understand that. But the result is that this procedure has never succeeded.
What worked are the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. For example, when Orbán tried to introduce a first law on foreign funding in 2017, it was struck down by the Luxembourg Court. This also prevents Orbán's followers in Europe from adopting the same legislative proposals in their own countries.
It's also the recovery plan and European funds in general that made the Orbán regime back down. In recent years, bills have been withdrawn or licenses have been reallocated to media outlets, which has allowed some independent newsrooms in Hungary to survive. For example, there's a very interesting media outlet, Partizán, on the Internet. It's very popular and has a substantial editorial team, which shows that it's possible to survive within the Orbán system.
But we are also faced with other problems linked to how global digital platforms operate. In fact, the political situation in Hungary prevents us from addressing these broader issues, which weigh on the media and democratic deliberation.
Can the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which came into force in August 2025, represent a turning point in how the European Union addresses these issues, in Hungary as elsewhere?
It's a shame we didn't have this tool in 2010, when Orbán came to power. Now, it's a real opportunity, and we need very strong commitment from the European Commission to enforce it. I welcome its decision to launch an infringement procedure in this regard. In December, Hungary thus became the first Member State prosecuted under the EMFA.
This is legislation that responds to the situation of certain Member States — it is not very diplomatic and the Commission will not say so openly — including Hungary. It is tailor-made. It addresses the independence of public media, their financing, notably in Article 5, the transparency of public advertising distribution, whether from the State or State-owned companies, as well as the independence of private newsrooms and market concentration.
There is also a mechanism that enables the Commission to take into account threats to pluralism that may result from market concentration. Previously, there were appeals made to the Commission that were rejected, because competition law was unable to fully account for the specificity of the media sector.
I would say that Europe has succeeded in its gamble. Now, this legislation must not remain a dead letter, and from what the Commission is doing, it's on the right track. It's still slow, but it gives reasons to be cautiously optimistic.
We're also seeing the Orbán method spreading, particularly in neighboring countries like Slovakia and Czechia. Is that something you agree with?
Orbán is dangerous, not just for his own country, but for all of Europe. We have people, not only in the region, but also in France or Italy with Giorgia Meloni in particular, who are inspired by Orbán's methods. It could moreover be noted that the origin of this method is Putin. The difference is that Orbán has managed to build a model within the European legal framework. Russia ranks much lower because the situation is very different: there, journalists are arrested.
In Czechia, we have a government that is also drawing inspiration from Viktor Orbán in its programme, notably when it comes to the independence of public media, which risks being weakened, and freedom of association, which also affects media. In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has already gone further. He has taken control of public media and is trying to do the same with the media authority. But Slovakia ranks 38th in our ranking while Hungary ranks much lower, because we are facing a different economic reality. In Slovakia, there are independent media funded by subscriptions and less dependent on state advertising.
It's also visible on a rhetorical level: attacks on journalists, smear campaigns, very common verbal attacks. In Slovakia, Fico's party paid to fuel hatred against journalists on Facebook. It's also a global method. The difference is that Orbán benefits from several advantages, including a parliamentary majority and the fact that he started very early, at a time when the EMFA didn't yet exist.
Could these methods be exported more widely across Europe? In France, Germany, Spain?
I think so. The Orbán method could bear fruit in other countries you mentioned, particularly regarding the independence of public media. They are the first ones threatened. As for private media, state advertising is a very powerful tool (of pressure, Editor's note), as is the media regulatory authority, through which one can undermine pluralism in the media market.
But it's more complex. I would point to two other factors that are very important: the international situation and national civil society. In Hungary, civil society is vibrant, but it hasn't managed to mobilize against Orbán's methods. Perhaps in these other countries it's stronger. On the international factor: the great ally of all these politically authoritarian leaders is Donald Trump. It's difficult to predict how the situation will evolve if Donald Trump's allies win a new national election in Europe. The media allies of the American president are investing in Europe, through Newsmax for example, which is opening offices in Europe and will broadcast in several countries content that is to the right of Fox News. We're in a media market that is increasingly becoming international. This can also weigh on the polarization of society that we're experiencing.
For these actors, Orbán, Trump, CNews, Fox News, the logic is one of narrative warfare. It is no longer a discussion based on facts and pluralism, but a media confrontation. When a party comes to power, it considers itself entitled to appropriate public media, relegating others to the status of opposition media. To reinforce this polarization, another method involves ignoring critical media: not responding to them, not debating with them. This creates the illusion of a single narrative.
You mentioned several people when speaking of "Donald Trump's allies." Can we speak more plainly about the far right? Can we establish a causal link between the rise of the far right and the deterioration of press freedom?
The short answer is yes. All extremes are dangerous. We also denounced what Jean-Luc Mélenchon did with regard to his choice of which media outlets to speak with. But indeed, there is a rise of the far right in Europe that threatens the press, with local specifics. You should know that in Poland, indeed, the PiS was the far right. In Slovakia and in Czechia, it's somewhat more complicated. You can't stop at that label. Giorgia Meloni is the far right, but at the same time, you could say she's pro-Ukraine. So it's more complicated than that. But yes, it's today the far right that threatens the press in Europe, among other things.
Can Europe move fast enough to "counter" this trend?
Yes, European institutions are slow. But at the same time, I think they are mobilizing. The problem is also the multi-crisis for media: oligarchs, authoritarian political leaders, digital platforms, social networks, and now AI. I hope the European Commission won't miss the AI train, the way it did with social networks.
What is clear is that we cannot rely solely on European institutions. Civil society needs to mobilize. The media needs to show solidarity with one another. Publishers may compete with each other, but journalists should cooperate.
It is absolutely critical, in this situation of fragmented media space and increased polarization fueled by social media, to invest in public media. Because they are the only ones that, today, in general, are able to speak to all of society and maintain a viable economic model while remaining editorially independent.
Mediapart has set aside a fund in case of a possible far-right takeover of power. Should media outlets actively prepare for it?
We know the methods of the RN, of the far right. They are Orbán's methods. So yes, Mediapart is right to prepare for this seizure of power. Mediapart can afford to do so, thanks to its subscription system. That's not the case for all media outlets. So the battle will mainly concern vulnerable media.
You explained that the threat to press freedom did not come solely from the far right, citing Jean-Luc Mélenchon for example, and more broadly mentioned the "extremes". On this subject, don't you think the threat is greater on one side of the political spectrum than the other today?
We must pay attention to two distinct threats: the Trumpification of public debate, which involves growing antagonism toward journalists and favoritism toward certain media aligned with political camps; and the political programs and public policies promoted by political forces. It is clear at this point that the entire political establishment, whether at the extremes or the center of the political spectrum, is tempted by Trumpification. It is on these grounds that RSF denounced the fragmentation of the journalistic field defended by La France Insoumise. It is equally evident that the European far right consistently defends programs and policies hostile to the media, particularly public service media.
To go further
- Why economic independence is no longer enough? From Hungary to France, Marine Doux analyzes the rise of legal and political pressures that are undermining media outlets, even when they have found their economic model.
- 91 incidents recorded in 2024. The latest report from the French Observatory of Press Freedom Violations documents the intensification of pressures against journalists in France.
- In Hungary, the media outlet 444 is preparing for financial asphyxiation. Gábor Kardos explains how his newsroom is anticipating a bill targeting foreign funding.
- How are independent media organizing against the far right? Discover our survey of actions, practices and formats.
